Professione amministratori: interlocking directorship e qualità degli utili nelle imprese italiane quotate

By | 2017-12-29T17:34:29+00:00 December 27th, 2017|

Arena Claudia/ Financial ReportingRiviste / Fascicolo: 2-2012


Al fine di aiutare a comprendere il ruolo rivestito dagli interlocking directorship nel contesto istituzionale italiano, il presente contributo ne analizza empiricamente l’influenza sulla qualità degli utili di bilancio. Adottando un campione di imprese italiane quotate tra il 2000 e il 2004, si rinviene che l’incidenza degli interlock nei CdA è negativamente correlata alla sostenibilità e alla value relevance dei valori di reddito. Tali risultati suggeriscono che la presenza di amministratori con incarichi multipli riduce il monitoraggio del CdA sul processo di redazione del bilancio, conducendo a valori contabili che non riflettono al meglio le performance economicofinanziarie dell’impresa. Questo studio contribuisce alla letteratura che annovera le caratteristiche di governance tra le determinanti del livello di trasparenza aziendale, al contempo fornendo evidenze utili per l’emanazione di future prescrizioni regolamentari.

This study explores the role of interlocking directorships among Italian listed companies, by looking at their influence on earnings quality. Examining a sample of firms over the period 2000-2004, the author finds that the incidence of ID on BoD is negatively related to the value relevance and the persistence of accounting earnings. This suggests that ID weakens the level of BoD’s monitoring on financial reporting process, thus leading to a lower earnings quality. These findings contribute to the lite- rature on the association between governance structures and accounting quality, at the same time providing evidence that could help regulators to further develop effective policy recommendations.

Keywords: interlocking directorship, board of directors, Italy, earnings quality


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Corporate governance and information asymmetry between shareholders and lenders: an analysis of Italian listed companies

By | 2017-12-22T14:35:12+00:00 December 22nd, 2017|

Pisano Sabrina, Lepore Luigi, Agrifoglio Rocco/ Financial ReportingRiviste / Fascicolo: 2-2015


This paper analyzes the information asymmetry between owner/manager and lenders. More specifically, the research investigates the role of corporate governance mechanisms in reducing the agency costs of debt. The findings show that lenders perceive higher agency costs of debt if the controlling shareholder owns a percentage of capital greater than 66%. Results also show that the presence of independent directors elected by minority shareholders on the board mitigates the agency conflicts between borrowers and lenders. In the same way, the audit committee independence reduces the agency costs of debt. Moreover, the study shows that when the audit committee chairman coincides with the board chairman banks perceive more risk and, therefore, a bigger asymmetry. This coincidence increases the concentration of power in the hands of just one person and this enhances the likelihood of opportunistic actions by the management that could damage lenders. This means that it is costly for companies to concede to just one person too much influence over the board activities, because it reduces the effectiveness of the monitoring role played by independent directors, increasing the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.

Keywords: Agency costs of debt, board of directors, audit committee, ownership concentration


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